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4 that Kant's exposition of the concept of the highest good is explicitly distanced from Christianity as he would have received it, can adapt itself variously to inflated or deflated readings of what Kant's religious hope amounts to. This precise wording is important. I have no intention of policing the wider application of a concept such as 'Christianity', which is rich, porous, shifting, and historically multi-faceted, with cultural as well as doctrinal dimensions. Indeed, after Kant, strands of Christianity become reconfigured in heavily Kantian terms, such that it requires acts of scholarship and imagination in order to appreciate how radically and explicitly Kant moves away from the traditions that he himself would have received. I also do not deny the significance of wider This distancing from Christianity, as he received it, is not found in Kant's characterization of the divine nature, where what he writes is largely compatible with what the tradition would call the 'preambles' of faith: those aspects of the divine nature that our reason can to some degree approach, without the articles of faith that rely upon divine revelation given in scripture. For Kant, practical reason 'inexorably leads to the concept of a single, most perfect, and rational primordial being' (A 814/B 842), a being of the 'highest perfection', a 'highest and all-sufficient being' (A 640/B 668; see also A 575-579/B 603-607; A 592-3/B 620-1; A 640/B 668; Coll, 27: 306; CPrR, 5: 140; LPR, 28: 1033-34; R 6248; MV, 29: 945) . In less familiar passages, Kant also aligns himself to a distinctively Platonic strand, taken up in part of the Christian tradition, which talks about creation as a diffusion of a plenitude of divine goodness. We find this notion, for example, in Aquinas, who writes that it is 'evident from the very nature and definition of the good' that 'the good is diffusive 5 of itself and of being'. Such 'diffusion befits God', by virtue of which 'God is the cause of being for other things (SCG, 1.37).
Kant invokes a similar notion of divine diffusion in the 1780s, telling us that:
God cognizes himself by means of his highest understanding as the all-sufficient ground of everything possible. He is most well-pleased with his unlimited faculty as regards all positive things, and it is just this well-pleasedness (Selbstzufriedenheit) with himself which causes him to make these possibilities actual. (LPR, 28: 1061) Kant relates such a conception of self-cognition and self-diffusion with the category of the highest good, writing that the deity 'although subjectively in need of no external thing, still cannot be thought to shut himself up within himself but rather' must be thought 'to be determined to produce the highest good beyond himself just by his consciousness of his all-sufficiency' (TP, 8: 280n) .
At this point, where we seem close to the Christian tradition, we come across the first, and, in some ways, all significant difference. In scholastic theology, the highest good of creation, as the fitting diffusion of divine goodness, is always identified, not with a perfect world, but with the beatific vision of God enjoyed by the blessed, of which the incarnation, the hypostatic union of God and man, is the paradigm and the means. In a way that would be quite alien to Kant's religious hope, the highest good is, above all, Christ, and not Christ as an example of a perfect Kantian, but as a living reality with whom we are in relationship, such that through Christ, we can enjoy the life of God in the beatific vision. In Aquinas, as Aquinas exegetes the theological tradition, we find a Platonic logic of diffusion leading inexorably to Christ:
6 It belongs to the essence of the highest good (summum bonum) to communicate itself in the highest manner to the creature, and this is brought about chiefly by "His so joining created nature to Himself that one Person is made up of these three -the Word, a soul and flesh", as good. There are nuances, differences and distinctions within the medieval tradition, about the relative priority of our willing or knowing in the beatific vision, about how precisely we might say
God is 'seen', and about whether our desire is satiated, or continuously expanding into God. These subtleties need not concern us, though, as the largest differences in scholastic thought about the 'highest good' amount to very little, in comparison to the difference between all of them and Kant's conception.
Kant agrees with the tradition that God, as the 'Supreme Being' (OPA, 2: 151), the 'All of Reality'
(A 575/B 603), is the highest uncreated good, or, as Kant puts it, the 'highest original good' (A 810/B 839). The rupture emerges, though, with Kant's account of the highest created good, which, for Kant, does not revolve around the enjoyment of, and participation in, God. What 'alone constitutes the highest good', Kant writes in the first Critique is 'happiness in exact proportion with the morality of rational beings, through which they are worthy of it' (A 814/B 842).
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The lexical field that Kant explores, when discussing his conception of the highest good, faithfully maps onto the terms that are associated, in the medieval tradition, with the concept of the 'summum bonum'. To avoid any arbitrary comparison of scholastic theology with Kant, I will restrict myself to discussing Kant's own lexical choices, which include 'summum bonum', 'beatitude', the 'final end' of creation, and the glorification and honoring of God, which in the medieval tradition, are the terms associated with the enjoyment of God's diffusion of God's goodness. In each case, I attempt to understand Kant's distinctive, and quietly subverting, usage, in relation to the tradition from which he receives these categories. Kant's most dramatic discontinuity with the traditions he receives, I will suggest, comes when he rejects the idea that God could be an 'object' that is good without limit for our will or practical reason, alongside his rejection of the medieval notion of divine-human 'concursus'. Towards the end of this section, I will dispatch the suggestion that Kant might, nonetheless, be a sort of Lutheran. It does not make cognition of God and his will the basis of these laws but only of the attainment of the highest good subject to the condition of observing these laws. (CPrR, 5: 129) Beatitude is the state of undistracted devotion to the moral law. God is needed to support and reward the attainment of this state, but we should not overlook the fact that beatitude is no longer, as it is for the tradition, itself the 'cognition of God and his will'.
In the scholastic tradition, the notion of the 'glorification' or 'glory' of God stands, quite precisely, In the Christian conception, God is the central constituent element of the highest created good, as that which is enjoyed, known and loved in this state; in Kant's schema, the highest good is a 'world of intelligences' acting in 'accordance with universal and necessary moral laws' (A 815/B 843).
God is in this community, certainly, as a sovereign (CPrR, ) and a Holy Will (GW, 4: 414), but the movement and structure on this conception is horizontal, between rational moral agents (of which God is an ideal instance), rather than vertical, between creatures and the creator.
It worth being attentive to the precise terms in which Kant singles out Christianity for praise, in contrast to Stoicism and Epicureanism. He writes that:
The doctrine of Christianity, even if it is not regarded as a religious doctrine, gives on this Kant's most dramatic theological move, which, I submit, unambiguously reveals the philosopher distancing himself from all previous Christian theology, Lutheran or Catholic, is not where we might expect. It is buried in the Groundwork, and in a rather recondite discussion in chapter two of the 'Analytic' of the second Critique. In the Groundwork, Kant searches for that which is 'unconditionally necessary', and for that which can be considered 'good without limitation'. In searching for the unconditioned, Kant is looking for a reality or principle that is sufficient, by itself and in itself, to move our will. Kant writes that 'if the will' seeks the law 'in a property of any of its objects -heteronomy always results':
The will in that case does not give itself the law; instead the object (das Object), by means of its relation to the will, gives the law to it. (GW, II. 4: 441)
We can only understand what Kant is doing here, if we grasp what he means by an 'object'. An 'object' can mean any reality whatsoever, of any ontological texture, created or uncreated, and not only empirical 'objects' or created substances. An 'object', in this sense, can be something as mundane as a table, but it can also be the 'essence of poetry', or the uncreated perfection that is
God. The 'essence of poetry' can be the object of our thought, without being an object. Just so with
God. When Kant insists that no object, external to the will's own activity, can be good without limit, and so have unconditioned value for our practical reason and will, he means precisely what he says: all objects are rejected, no matter how elevated, created or uncreated. Kant's departure from the theological tradition, lies in his denial that even God could constitute an unconditioned and good-without-limitation object for our practical reason and will. No theologian had ever before offered a similar denial, or anything close to one. Rather, the universal claim in the prior tradition, which we find intact in Kant's sources such as Leibniz x , is that only God is the proper and final 'object' (obiectus) of our willing and knowing.
Commentators do not always see the drama of Kant's move here, and focus on Kant's more obvious targets, such as commands, sensations and rewards. But Kant is clear that he rejects all objects that could be presented to the will. In the Groundwork, having rejected the more obvious failed 12 candidates for the unconditioned good (pleasurable sensations, rewards, honour and fortune), Kant turns to the very 'principle of perfection' (GW, II, 4: 444; see also GW, 4: 410; CPrR, 5: 64). Kant's explicit target here is the 'universal practical philosophy' of Christian Wolff, where the identification of perfection and God is clear xi . In the second Critique, Kant comments that 'the occasioning ground of all the errors of philosophers', when searching for that which is good without limitation, is the search for 'an object of the will' (CPrR, 5: 64). The point is that it is not the unworthiness of the object that concerns Kant, but the reception of anything external to the will whatsoever, because, as Kant writes 'anything which presents itself as an object of the will...is excluded from the determining grounds of the will called the unconditionally good' (CPrR, 5: 74), even when the object is 'happiness', 'perfection' or the 'will of God' (CPrR, 5: 64). Any 'principle', external and prior to the will's own 'universal lawgiving' (CPrR, 5: 64) , is 'heteronomy' (CPrR, 5: 64).
Kant's proscribing of external objects is not disturbed by passages, from the 'Dialectic' of the second Critique, where Kant identifies the highest good itself as the object of pure practical reason and the will. Here he speaks of the 'highest good' as the 'whole object of pure practical reason' (CPrR, 5: 119; see also CPrR, 5: 115, 122, 124, 129) . Because, for Kant, the 'highest good', for our will and practical reason, is not something external, such as God, but is rather the full achievement and product of our own universal lawgiving, were it to be, in fact, universal. Even if an external object, God, is needed to guarantee the possibility of this, what is hoped for is not itself an external object, but the flourishing of our own autonomous lawgiving, where the will 'has as its object', Kant writes, 'itself as giving universal law' (CPrR, 5: 432).
For Kant, freedom is destroyed when the will is moved at all, even if the external object that moves the will is 'perfection' itself (GW, 4: 410 In denying concursus, Kant squarely sets his face against medieval theology. And in insisting that our true freedom comes from ourselves alone, in relation to the good 'we ourselves must do' (Rel, 6: 53) , and where the will has 'as its object', not God, but 'itself as giving universal law' (CPrR, 5: 432), Kant also offends the deepest Lutheran instinct that we have no freedom, and no goodness, except that which comes as a sheer gift from God. For the Lutheran, our moral transformation towards virtue ('sanctification'), depends entirely upon divine action, and follows from our being justified by Christ, and is in no way the cause of this justification. 'Free will', Luther writes in the All of this is not to deny the significance of the positive ways in which Kant conceives of God being involved in upholding and maintaining the state which is the highest good. God is the creator and sustainer of noumenal substances (CPrR, 5: 100-102; LPR, 28: 1104) . God is the sovereign in the Kingdom of Ends, and we should regard all duties 'as divine commands' (CPrR, 5: 129), although the content of these duties is given in the moral law, which is determined independently of the divine will. God as the Holy Will can, unlike us, do no other than follow the moral law (GW, 4: 412), and will always be, therefore, a first among equals within the moral community of the Kingdom of Ends. God as omniscient knows our virtue, and as omnipotent can ensure that happiness is appropriately distributed, and as benevolent, will do so (CPrR, Rel, ; CJ, 5: 450*). God provides a supplement to our own moral efforts, in our constantly precarious attempts to be good (Rel, (173) (174) , although this can seem to run aground on Kant's own requirements for justice, and for genuinely imputable free moral action. More speculatively, there are fragmentary hints in Kant, especially in his final writings, that God is in some sense identified with the divinity within us, which is our own legislating and following of the moral law (OP, ).
All of these strands are important and prima facie evidence of Kant's genuine religiosity. But all of them depart from the central claim of the Christian tradition, which is that God, and not just the moral law which God necessarily commands, is the all-satiating end-point and final object of our loving and knowing, and where God is, in the technical terms employed here, an external object (and so not co-extensive with our own moral law-giving), who nonetheless, and uniquely, acts interiorly within creatures, in all they do, in a way that does not violate, but constitutes, their 15 freedom. In relation to this claim, for the traditional theologian, Kant' language, as it is to regard these hopes as a lopped-off, derivative, or heretical schism from Christianity. For Kant, as in Platonism, human flourishing involves a deepening participation in a structure of reason that transcends the individual and the particular, where reason seeks its resting place in the unconditioned. Autonomy, whereby we give ourselves the rational law which is itself the shape of our own grasping of the rational law, can be construed as a variant on a perennial classical paradigm, whereby that which has unconditioned value is thought thinking itself, and rational will willing itself. In the 1790s Kant reflects that 'a hidden idea of philosophy has long been present among men' (LPE, 29: 9) . This hidden idea goes back to 'the ancient Greek philosophers' whose 'principal object' is 'the destination of man, and the means to achieve it' (LPE, 29:9). The true 'Idea of the philosopher', as Kant puts it, is expressed by Plato's Socrates, as one seeking, and never quite reaching, the 'Idea of wisdom' (LPE, 29: 8; see also A 314-318/B 271-75).
This will be a hint that I return to in the final moments of this article. We turn now, though, to a consideration of Kant's hopes for politics and history.
III Kant's Political Hope
The highest created good, for Kant, is a moral community, a 'great whole', a 'systematic unity of ends' in a 'world of intelligences', acting in 'accordance with universal and necessary moral laws' (A 815/B 843; see also CPrR, 5: 110-113). In the state of the highest created good, we are not centrally referred or oriented to the transcendence of God. The notion of 'transcendence' derives etymologically from the Latin term transcendere, 'to go beyond'. The concept of transcendence need not enter our thought as an absolute presence, possession, and foundation, but can act subversively upon all our thinking, by marking a space that 'goes beyond' our knowledge, experience and competence. Everything that is, can be relativized, and rendered passive and dependent, by virtue of the transcendence which goes beyond it.
Amongst other things, the Christian notion of 'transcendence' draws our attention to should not be construed as 'otherworldly', in the sense that we are perhaps 'made for another place -a metaphysical Mars, perhaps', whilst 'for some obscure reason' we are 'trapped in this one' xxx .
Rather, 'Christians are not otherworldly, but most fundamentally "other-temporalitied": "The world" is more primordially an era than a place' xxxi . Mathewes talks of living within a 'tensive structure' of 'commitment and longing', where, as much as anything, we must 'cultivating appropriate dissatisfactions' xxxii .
The contrasting and undercutting work done by transcendence can have a sharp edge politically.
Specifically, it should block the identification of particular groups or causes with God, which 20 Rawls, rightly, found a distressing feature of Christianity 'in the field' ('God aims our bullets').
Such a conception of transcendence will undercut any confidence in, or even a hopeful orientation towards, historical and political progress. The Augustine commentator Paul Griffiths reflects that an approach that emphasizes peregrinatio will find 'most kinds of political progressivism (the view that we can, in this age, significantly improve our politics)' to be 'utopian', such that progressivism 'may never be endorsed by Christians'. xxxiii 'The outcome', Griffiths writes, of even our best efforts, will always be, in a formal sense, exactly the same': 'an unpredictable blend of the good and the dreadful' xxxiv .
Curiously mirroring the ethical concerns about Christianity, expressed above by Rawls, we find a constellation of Christian thinkers, broadly in an Augustinian tradition, begin to articulate a set of ethical concerns about Kantian hope: specifically, that it is, in a sense, too religious, or more precisely, too religious about what reason and human action can do in hoc saeculo, in the 'secular'.
If the theologian was to be mischievously pedantic, she might suggest that Rawls' Kant risks not being 'secular enough', according at least to the concept's eschatological etymology, where the significance of 'this time', and its local aspirations, are suspended and relativized. Rawls accuses Christianity of absolutizing human projects, whilst the theologian finds in Rawls, and Kant, the same absolutizing move, with its own peculiar dangers, if and when there is any self-satisfaction at having no 'religious' beliefs.
Such an alignment of Kant with a religious optimism about moral history is too quick though. It pushes, I suspect, Kant into too Christian a mind-set, with the paradigm of moving from one temporality into another temporality: from historical progress, into the moral state. If the Rawlsian learns that he may miss transcendence more than he expected, the Christian theologian must learn that Christianity has no monopoly upon transcendence. We should begin by considering all the things that historical progress, for Kant, is not. It is not, or not straightforwardly, moral progress at 21 all. In his essay on Perpetual Peace, Kant affirms that a 'republican constitution', which is 'completely compatible with the right of human beings', could be achieved even by a 'nation of devils (if only they have understanding) ' (PP, 8: 366; see also IUH, 8: 26; Rel, 6: 27, [33] [34] [93] [94] . This is because the 'problem' of founding a state is not concerned with 'the moral improvement of human beings but only the mechanism of nature', where human beings have to 'constrain one another to submit to coercive law and so bring about a condition of peace in which laws have force' (PP, 8: 366; see also IUH 8:26; Rel 6: 27, (33) (34) (93) (94) . In 1798 Kant writes that we can never observe 'an ever-growing quantity' of 'morality with regard to intention', but only ever 'an increase of the products of legality in dutiful actions whatever their motives' (CF, 7: 91) . This is because we only ever have 'empirical data (experiences) upon which we are founding this prediction':
namely, the physical cause of our actions as these actually occur as phenomena; and not the moral cause. (CF, 7: 91) Even the 'realization of the' ideal of an international 'cosmopolitan society', wherein all 'external relations' are conducted rightfully, could occur 'without the moral foundation in humanity having to be enlarged in the least' (CF, 7: 92).
Kant tracks this limitation in what we can infer from empirical deeds back to his transcendental idealism: the claim that all we can ever experience is the world as it is received through our spatial and temporal forms of intuition, where moral freedom, if it exists, and we must presuppose that it does, must exist in the world prior to, and independently of, this spatio-and temporal reception. All that we can ever experience is 'that which appears', or the 'phenomenon', and the whole history of good deeds and progress, no matter how glorious, 'resides alone in phenomena, and not the moral cause' (CF, 7: 91; see also PP, 8: 360) .
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Precisely what Kant is committing himself to with his transcendental idealism is, of course, hugely I will try to say, next, something that exponents of a less extravagant construal of transcendental idealism might be able to agree with. I will then conclude the article on a more extravagant note, with some brief comments about the lines of justification I would explore, if space and time allowed. First of all, the 'big tent' observation: however we construe such language, Kant does choose to talk, a lot, continuously through the 1780s and 90s, about our fundamental nontemporality, especially in relation to freedom and morality. This choice, however we construe it, subverts a progressivism about history and politics, as well as indicating a different paradigm and structure for 'transcendence', and hope, than that employed in the Christian traditions received by Kant. 23 On any interpretation of transcendental idealism, the need to identify progress in history is a 'regulative idea', indexed not to a hidden insight into divine purposes, but, rather, arising from our limited cognitive abilities (CJ, ). Because we cannot hope to understand how sheer mechanism 'that no intention has ordered' can bring about even 'the generation of a blade of grass'
(CJ, 5: 400), we find it necessary to think in terms of natural teleology, especially in the sphere of biology, of which, perhaps surprisingly, human history is a sub-section xxxvi . This is a necessity that goes from the micro (the internal organic constitution of the blade of grass) to the macro (the course of that part of mechanical organic nature that we call 'human history'). A more gifted cognizer, not constrained by receiving the world spatially and temporally, might well have no need to make regulative recourse to something beyond mechanism, in order to understand the blade of grass, or human history (CJ, 5: 397-398).
The hope for the 'highest good' in Kant's thought has a quite different pedigree, status and destiny to any hope we might have for historical progress. Kant tells us, in the third Critique, that the moral proof for the existence of God as the guarantor of the highest good 'would always remain in force even if we found in the world', which includes that part of nature which is human history, 'no material for physical teleology at all' (CJ, 5: 478) . The seam of thought that runs from the highest good to God is, Kant tells us, 'essentially different', indeed 'entirely independent', from anything that 'concepts of nature can contain and teach', that is from any regulative warrant, and need, to ascribe teleology to nature, which includes history (CJ, 5: 478). As such, belief in the highest good , which is practical, and not merely regulative, has a securer epistemic status than belief in historical progress.
The picture suggested by Kant, on the construal I am presenting, is one where history is not preparatory for a future moral state, but is, or might be, an emanation of a fundamental moral 24 reality. Those prepared to travel down more metaphysically committed paths of Kant exegesis, might say that the history of human actions, as with everything that appears, is the appearance of that which is fundamentally non-spatial and non-temporal, where there is no sense in which we move towards or further away from the noumenal dimension wherein morality resides. Everything that appears, all phenomena, are equidistant, equally disclosing and veiling of ultimate reality. As Although we 'cannot see through' to our fundamental disposition (Gesinnung), we make a fallible 'inference' from 'perceptions that are only appearances of a good or bad disposition' (Rel, 6: 71).
I would submit that some of the difficulties thought to surround a more metaphysically committed example, is a 'way of cognizing the interior of the human being from the exterior' (APV, 7: 283) . This is consonant with the role of appearances outlined above, as the only, albeit precariously limited, means by which we can make inferences about our fundamental moral character. The irreducible and in-principle precariousness of the medium could even motivate careful empirical study.
I do not deny that such a conception of noumenal freedom is 'difficult' for us, and hardly a gripping, intuitive, or useful account, at least by itself, of the moral life. But some things which are difficult for us, might not have been so problematic for Kant, whose antennae for plausibility must be, to some extent, framed by his rationalist heritage, used to conceiving of the experienced world as a well-founded phenomenon, grounded upon a fundamentally different underlying reality. Kant could, by his own account, move a long way from Leibniz, but still not be 'one of us'.
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In Kant's chosen association of morality with the language of non-temporality, and especially on the more metaphysically committed interpretation of Kant, we discover a fascinating reassertion of a type of undercutting and omnipresent transcendence, but in a different key to the one we find in the Christian tradition. Noumenal reality sustains the experienced world, and undercuts everywhere our confident assertions about its nature, because, as with the non-spatial and non-temporal first cause of classical Christianity, it is not inserted into any one place or time in particular. Only the total transcendence guarantees such ubiquitous immanence, and serves as a source of hope that how things appear is not how things fundamentally are, alongside a constant deflation of our confident claims at absolute knowledge. There is a difference though in the source and shape of the transcendence. In Augustinian Christianity, God, the creator ex nihilo, is the source, with the mode of unveiling being fundamentally temporal: we live in 'this age' (hoc saeculo), expecting in the eschaton to be differently temporalized in the 'age of ages' (saecula saeculorum), by the gracious action of a transcendent God. In Kant, the source of the transcendence is more our own divinity, as we participate in a fundamental and invisible way in a self-transcending reason, which constitutes the moral law. We do not hope to be 'differently temporalized', but rather to be, in a fundamental way, other than temporalized, where time is the moving image of our own eternity.
In 1798, Kant asks what underlies 'the idea' of a political constitution 'in harmony with the natural right of human beings' (CF, 7:90) . What underlies 'all political forms', Kant asserts, is a 'Platonic ideal', that is, as he goes onto explain, a 'respublica noumenon', of which we have 'in our experience', the disclosing and veiling appearance, the 'respublica phaenomenon' (CF, 7: 91) . This is transcendence, but differently organized. We live not 'in hoc saeculo', hoping for the City of God. Rather we experience the 'respublica phaenomenon', trusting and hoping in its not-impossible and therefore to-be-believed-in foundation in the 'respublica noumenon', with the locus of our hope being our own 'proper selves' (GW, 4: 461), moral, free, invisible, everywhere acting because 27 nowhere in particular. The 'respublic noumenon', Kant insists, is not 'an empty figment of the brain', but 'rather the eternal norm for all civil organization in general' (CF, 7: 91) . The Christian theologian might not find in Kant's thought theology's 'other', the secular, but, perhaps, another theology, for whom the 'secular' (this time) is not fundamental.
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